

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

10 September 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM :   
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia

SUBJECT : East Asia Warning Meeting

Following is the agenda for the East Asia Warning Meeting, scheduled for Wednesday, 17 September 1980 at 1400 hours in Room 7 E 62, CIA Headquarters.

China

- NPC Assessment:
- a. How the domestic future look?
  - b. Any changes forthcoming on foreign policy?

Indochina

Military situation in Kampuchea and Laos

South Korea

- a. Domestic reaction to the Chun Government -- the new Cabinet. What role is the military likely to retain?
- b. Outlook for the Constitution -- popular reaction to its content and the Government's handling of the referendum?
- c. Impact of the sentencing of Kim Tae-chung on the ROK domestic and international situation.

North Korea

- a. Reaction to the advent of the Chun regime -- does it presage a harder line toward the South?
- b. Reasons behind cancellation of visit by US academics?
- c. Status of preparations for the Party Congress -- issue of the succession.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

All NIOs

Each of you will have received [ ] agenda for our monthly warning meeting Tuesday, 9 September, at 9:00 a.m. As I announced last week, we will lead off [ ] for a few minutes and after that turn to this agenda. The concerned NIOs should be prepared to comment on each agenda item.

Richard Lehman  
C/NIC

Date 8 September 1980

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted] Approved For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000300060041

Attached is a proposed agenda for the  
September NIC warning meeting.

*Handwritten initials:* CH, JH, BMT

[redacted]

A/NIO/W

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II. USSR-Iran

The General Staff command post exercise in the Transcaucasus and Turkestan Military Districts ended on 29 August.

A. Soviet intentions: An alternative hypothesis—Were the Soviets running a bluff to forestall a perceived prospect of US military action to rescue the hostages and/or overturn the Khomeini regime?

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2. During the General Staff exercise, Moscow radio charged the US with planning a "dangerous provocation" in southwest Asia and observed that if the US "military machine is put into action it is very unlikely that the armed conflict will be limited to Iran alone." In a message intended to be conveyed to the US, the Soviet attache in Tehran told

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that the Soviets believe President Carter has decided to make another attempt to rescue the hostages and that this attempt might take place during the trial of the hostages. In this event, he said, the USSR would be bound to intervene under the 1921 Soviet-Iranian treaty.

3. Four days after the issuance of SNIE 11/34-4-80: "Soviet Military Options in Iran," the US press (dateline 25 August) reported that "Defense Department intelligence specialists have concluded that an American military assault against Iran would probably lead the Soviet Union to send forces into the country." According to these accounts, US officials said that this intelligence judgment had led the President and his senior aides "to rule out military action against Iran, barring a significant worsening in the treatment of the hostages." TASS, in an oblique (and self-congratulatory) comment on

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the dangerous —and in the event disastrous—game the Soviets played in May 1967 in warning Damascus and Cairo that Israel was preparing to attack Syria).

2. TASS aired this allegation on 30 August, charging that "the Israeli military is stepping up joint military activities with right-wing Christian secessionist units in an attempt to secure a stronghold on the Mediterranean coast....Israel is preparing a large-scale aggressive operation against Lebanon, backed by the US, in order to tear away new lands from that country. Israel has started military exercises in the Golan Heights area to exert military pressure on Syria."

B. Do the Soviets perceive an opportunity to lever their way back into the Middle East "peace process?" Are their attempts to aggravate and capitalize on high tensions in Lebanon aimed at preparing the ground for a political initiative, e.g., a proposal for a general conference on a "comprehensive" settlement as an alternative to the Camp David process? TASS warned that "continued Israeli provocations will lead to further aggravation of tensions and worsen the Middle East situation."

#### IV. Ethiopia-Somalia

##### A. Ethiopian reaction to the US-Somali facilities agreement:

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1. The Mengistu regime appears to view the agreement as a serious setback.

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these press accounts, observed that "over the recent period the Soviet Union has done a good deal to frustrate the imperialist forces' intrigues against Iran....The question remains open what would have been the result of US imperialism's attempts at suppressing the Iranian revolution by force, were it not for the Soviet Union's such resolute support for the Islamic Republic of Iran."

C. "Food for thought"

Barton Whaley (Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War) has defined deception as an "operation which succeeds in anticipating the preconceptions of the victim and playing upon them."

25X1 [redacted] Handbook on Warning Intelligence, observed that "apparently there has never, at least since World War II, been an inadvertent leak of the specific military plans or intentions of a Communist nation....The misleading of one's own people has been an important feature in many deceptions, with the unwitting participants in the plan convincingly carrying out their roles in good faith and thus contributing materially to the success of the operation....It is essential to the recognition of deception that the probability or at least the possibility of its occurrence be anticipated—or else we will almost inevitably be gullible victims of even a simple deception plan."

III. Israel-Lebanon-Syria-USSR

A. Soviet exploitation of tensions in Lebanon aggravated by Phalange ambitions, suspicions of Israeli intentions to expand attacks on Palestinians in the south, and Syria's reactions (attempts to intercept Israeli reconnaissance aircraft). 25X1

[redacted] 25X1  
(Recall

3. Mengistu's letter to President Carter protested the agreement with Somalia and claimed it was a threat to the unity of Ethiopia and to Africa's stability. In presenting the letter to the US Embassy, Foreign Minister Feleke warned that these developments would require military actions that "might extend beyond Ethiopia's frontiers." 25X1

B. Community assessments since June have discounted the likelihood of a major Ethiopian attack into northern Somalia. This judgment was based in part on the assumption that Ethiopia would not attempt simultaneous offensives in both Eritrea and Somalia. Does the failure to begin the planned offensive to retake Nacfa in mid-August alter this judgment? 25X1

D. The principal question for warning judgment is whether the Mengistu regime will consider SSF guerrilla operations to "destabilize" the Siad government an adequate response to what it has characterized as a threat to the unity of Ethiopia? Is the Community underestimating the strength of Ethiopian reaction to the US-Somali agreement and the scope of Ethiopian military preparations for an offensive against Somalia? Is Ethiopian policy shaped by defensive or offensive motives? 25X1

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5 September 1980

NIC Warning Agenda for SeptemberI. Poland-USSR

A. Prospects for renewed confrontation between workers and regime over the next three months:

1. Tests of strength over (a) the free unions' right to represent workers in negotiating wage agreements and expressing views on national economic priorities; (b) free unions' pressure for a greater political role that would challenge the settlement provisos that unions will not play the role of a political party and would recognize the leading role of the Polish Communist Party. (Walesa reportedly told the final strike meeting, "We are now co-masters of this land.")

B. A power struggle in the party leadership.

1. INR assessment on 1 September: The balance in the leadership has already shifted in favor of the "moderate and pragmatic faction." "The tug-of-war within the leadership is likely to intensify now that the immediate danger of violence has receded."

C. Strains in Polish-Soviet relations

1. Soviet attempts to strengthen those Polish party leaders who advocate prompt moves to erode or nullify concessions to the strike committees.

2. Soviet efforts to use hard-currency loans and other economic assistance to influence the balance of power in the Warsaw regime and the latter's policies.

3. The danger that the Soviets, in their anxiety to contain the damage to the Polish party's monopoly of power and ramifications throughout Eastern Europe, will overestimate Warsaw's ability to restrict the free unions' rights and authority.

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INTELLIGENCE SOURCES  
AND METHODS INVOLVED

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